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Peer-to-Peer energy trading in a Microgrid☆
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H I G H L I G H T S
• P2P energy trading refers to direct energy trading among prosumers and consumers.
• A P2P system architecture was developed.
• A P2P energy trading platform, Elecbay, was designed.
• P2P energy trading was simulated based on game theory.
• Results prove that P2P energy trading facilitates local power and energy balance.
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A B S T R A C T
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading represents direct energy trading between peers, where energy from small-scale
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) in dwellings, oﬃces, factories, etc, is traded among local energy prosumers
and consumers. A hierarchical system architecture model was proposed to identify and categorize the key ele-
ments and technologies involved in P2P energy trading. A P2P energy trading platform was designed and P2P
energy trading was simulated using game theory. Test results in a LV grid-connected Microgrid show that P2P
energy trading is able to improve the local balance of energy generation and consumption. Moreover, the in-
creased diversity of generation and load proﬁles of peers is able to further facilitate the balance.
1. Introduction
With the increasing connection of Distributed Energy Resources
(DERs), traditional energy consumers are becoming prosumers, who
can both consume and generate energy [1]. Electricity generation of
DERs is usually intermittent and diﬃcult to predict. When prosumers
have surplus electricity, they can curtail it, store it with energy storage
devices, export it back to the power grid, or sell it to other energy
consumers. The direct energy trading among consumers and prosumers
is called Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading, which is developed based
on the “P2P economy” concept (also known as sharing economy) [2],
and is usually implemented within a local electricity distribution
system.
A peer in the P2P energy trading refers to one or a group of local
energy customers, including generators, consumers and prosumers. The
peers buy or sell energy directly with each other without intermedia-
tion by conventional energy suppliers [3]. P2P energy trading is usually
enabled by Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) -based
online services [2].
Conventional energy trading is mainly unidirectional. Electricity is
usually transmitted from large-scale generators to consumers over long
distances, while the cash ﬂow goes the opposite way. In contrast, the
P2P energy trading encourages multidirectional trading within a local
geographical area. Trials of energy trading based on the “P2P economy”
concept have already been carried out across the globe, for example,
Piclo in the UK [4], Vandebron in Netherlands [5], and sonnenCom-
munity in Germany [6]. These trials mainly focused on providing in-
centive tariﬀs to electricity customers from the energy suppliers’ per-
spective.
Piclo is an online platform that performs peer-to-peer energy
trading for generators and business consumers. It uses a matching al-
gorithm to match local generation and consumption. Data visualiza-
tions and analytics are provided to customers. The meter data, gen-
erator pricing and consumer preference information are used to match
electricity demand and supply every half hour. Generators have control
and visibility over who buys electricity from them. Consumers can se-
lect and prioritize from which generators to buy electricity [4].
Vandebron is an online platform in Netherland where energy
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consumers can buy electricity directly from independent producers,
such as farmers with wind turbines. Similar to Piclo, Vandebron acts as
an energy supplier who provides incentive tariﬀs for consumers and
generators to exchange energy. Prosumers who inject surplus energy to
Vandebron are able to purchase energy from Vandebron at a lower
price compared with other suppliers [5].
SonnenCommunity was developed by SonnenBatterie, which is a
battery storage manufacturer in Germany. It is a community of
SonnenBatterie owners who share self-produced energy with others
with a low-priced tariﬀ provided by SonnenCommunity. With a
SonnenBatterie system and photovoltaic panels, members can com-
pletely cover their own energy needs on sunny days, and even have
surplus energy. This surplus energy is not fed into the power grid, but
into battery energy storage that serves the community when they
cannot produce suﬃcient energy due to bad weather [6]. The idea is
very similar to those of Piclo and Vandebron, but sonnenCommunity
highlights the importance of the storage system.
In recent years, P2P energy trading has also been investigated at the
distribution network level. In [7], a paradigm of P2P energy sharing
among neighboring Microgrids was proposed for improving the utili-
zation of local DERs and saving the energy bills for all Microgrids. Alam
et al. [8] integrated a demand side management system coordinated
with P2P energy trading among the households in the smart grid in
order to minimize energy cost. In [9], an energy sharing model with
price-based demand response was proposed. In [10], a non-cooperative
game-theoretical model of the competition between demand response
aggregators for selling energy stored in energy storage was illustrated.
The operation of Microgrids and multi-agent energy management
systems in liberalized electricity has been widely discussed in recent
years. Roche et al. [11] provided a review of several multi-agent sys-
tems which were used for grid energy management. A number of con-
cepts and experiments were compared and analysed. In [12], a selection
of available models for distributed generation planning and design was
presented and analysed in the perspective of gathering their capabilities
in an optimization framework to support a paradigm shift in urban
energy systems. In [13], a retailing spot market of electric energy was
proposed. Its interoperability with other stakeholders in the electric
power infrastructure, which was modelled as a cooperating multi-agent
system was elaborated. Mashhour et al. [14] presented a novel hourly-
ahead proﬁt model for an active distribution company, which had high
capacity level of connected Distributed Generators (DGs) that could
make selling proposals for the markets in a pool-based system. Besides,
a proﬁt-based network reconﬁguration methodology for a multi-sub-
station multi-feeder distribution company was also introduced and
analysed. Vergados et al. [15] studied the problem of orchestrating the
energy prosumers into virtual clusters, in order to participate in the
market as a single entity and to reduce the total energy cost through the
reduction of the total relative forecasting inaccuracies. In [16], a gen-
eral framework for implementing a retail energy market based on the
Nikaido-Isoda relaxation algorithm was proposed as an electricity
market structure with large DERs penetration and demand side man-
agement of consumers. By considering the related uncertainties, the
DERs were able to maximise their expected payoﬀ or proﬁt by under-
taking strategies through the price bidding strategy considering Nash
equilibrium. Coelho et al. [17] discussed the major issues and chal-
lenges in multi-agent system and smart Microgrids, presented a review
of state-of-the-art applications and trends, and suggested future appli-
cations with attention to renewable energy resources integration in
emerging scenarios, which would be able to decentralise the high
complex energy system, allowing users to participate in the system
more actively.
The work presented in this paper contains prominent novelty and
contributions compared to the above listed literature. First of all, al-
though many of the above listed papers (including [11,13,15–17])
considered liberalized markets in the forms of bilateral contracts, auc-
tions or energy pools, the entities in the markets were all modelled as
either generators or consumers. However, prosumers who are able to
both generate and consume electricity are an important type of market
entities, and they are not supposed to be modelled as pure generators or
pure consumers. In this paper, the prosumers were modelled as entities
that are able to shift their roles between generators and consumers. As a
result, the ways of dealing with the energy trading among the market
entities are changed as well. Secondly, in some of the studies mentioned
in [17], the multi-agent systems were used for supporting Microgrid
operation and management, or for improving supply reliability and
stability. Those are diﬀerent from the P2P energy trading discussed in
this paper, in which the major objective of each peer is to maximise its
own economic beneﬁts. Thirdly, this paper establishes a four-layer
system architecture model for P2P energy trading and proposes an as-
sociated bidding system for the P2P energy trading among consumers
and prosumers in a grid-connected Microgrid for the ﬁrst time, both of
which were not addressed in existing studies. Last but not the least, this
paper also provides more results on the beneﬁts of P2P energy trading,
which were not fully investigated in existing literature.
The structure of this paper is summarized as follows. In Section 2, a
four-layer system architecture of the P2P energy trading is proposed.
Section 3 discusses a business model and the design of an online trading
platform ‘Elecbay’. It is an example of the possible implementations in
the business layer, based on which a P2P energy trading is carried out.
In Section 4, game theory and Nash Equilibrium are used to validate
how energy is traded among peers within a Microgrid during the bid-
ding process. Case study is presented in Section 5, in which the beneﬁts
of using the P2P energy trading are demonstrated. Section 6 concludes
the whole paper.
2. Four-layer system architecture of Peer-to-Peer energy trading
A four-layer system architecture is proposed for P2P energy trading,
as shown in Fig. 1, to identify and categorize the key elements and
technologies involved in P2P energy trading based on the roles they
play.
There are three dimensions in the system architecture.
In the ﬁrst dimension, the key functions involved in P2P energy
trading are categorized into four interoperable layers. Each layer is
introduced as follows.
The power grid layer consists of all physical components of the
power system, including feeders, transformers, smart meters, loads,
DERs, etc. These components form the physical electricity distribution
network where P2P energy trading is implemented.
The ICT layer consists of communication devices, protocols, appli-
cations and information ﬂow. Communication devices refer to sensors,
wired/wireless communication connections, routers, switches, servers
and various types of computers. Protocols include TCP/IP
(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), PPP (Point-to-Point
Protocol), X2.5, etc. Communication applications can be various, such
as information transfer and ﬁle exchange. The information ﬂow refers
to the senders, the receivers, and the content of each message trans-
ferred among communication devices.
The control layer mainly consists of the control functions of the
electricity distribution system. Diﬀerent control strategies are deﬁned
in this layer for preserving the quality and reliability of power supply
and control the power ﬂow. Voltage control, frequency control and
active power control are examples of possible control functions in the
control layer.
Business layer determines how electricity is traded among peers and
with the third parties. It mainly involves peers, suppliers, distribution
system operators (DSOs) and energy market regulators. Various kinds of
business models could be developed in this layer to implement diﬀerent
forms of P2P energy trading.
The second dimension of the system architecture is categorized
based on the size of the peers participating in P2P energy trading, i.e.
premises, Microgrids, Cells, and regions (consisting of multi-Cells).
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Individual premise refers to one single house connected to the elec-
tricity distribution system. Microgrids are electricity distribution sys-
tems containing loads and DERs, which operate in a controlled and
coordinated way either connected to the main power network or is-
landed. A Microgrid normally consists of a collection of individual
premises and DERs in a local geographical area that share the same
medium-voltage/low-voltage (MV/LV) transformer. Similarly, Cell is a
concept proposed in studies [18,19], and is an entity that consists of a
number of Microgrids. It is used to deﬁne a wider area of network in
which a collection of DERs can be controlled in response to a number of
objectives [20]. A Cell may contain several Microgrids, and may also
operate in either grid-connected or islanded mode. A region can be as
large as a city or a metropolitan area which consists of multiple Cells. A
Microgrid, a Cell or a region can all be considered as a peer and trade
with each other.
The third dimension shows the time sequence of the P2P energy
trading process. Bidding is the ﬁrst process of P2P energy trading when
energy customers (generators, consumers and prosumers) reach trading
agreements with each other prior to the energy exchange. During the
bidding process, energy customers interact with each other and agree
on the price and amount of energy to be traded. Energy exchanging is
the second process, during which energy is generated, transmitted and
consumed. Settlement is the ﬁnal process when bills and transactions
are ﬁnally settled via settlement arrangements and payment.
Considering the physical network constraints and uncertainty of DERs,
a seller who has promised to sell a certain amount of electricity
sometimes is unable to generate that exact amount as listed in the or-
ders. The similar situation also applies to a buyer. The diﬀerence be-
tween the promised and actual electricity generation or consumption
quantity needs to be calculated and charged during the settlement.
There are various types of elements and technologies which are
suitable for the implementation of P2P energy trading. Identiﬁcation is
the process of ﬁnding or deﬁning the key elements or technologies for
P2P energy trading. Categorization is the process of grouping those key
elements and technologies into diﬀerent layers and sections as in-
troduced in Fig. 1 for a better presentation and implementation. The
categorization is mainly based on their functionality, size of peers and
timescale in P2P energy trading.
This paper focuses on the business layer during the bidding process
in a grid-connected LV Microgrid. The business layer presents the
fundamental diﬀerences of P2P energy trading compared with tradi-
tional energy trading. Investigation of the business layer is also the
basis of research in other layers.
3. Platform for Peer-to-Peer energy trading
Diﬀerent energy trading arrangements for local distribution net-
works have been investigated, for example, the local pool concept was
used to aggregates the distributed generation from a local area
(pooling) to supply the local consumers without using additional
wholesale market intermediaries [21]. The objective of the local pool is
to balance the local energy generation and demand with minimum
generation costs [22].
“P2P economy”, also known as “sharing economy”, was recently
proposed for the energy trading arrangements in local distribution
networks. P2P energy trading allows each peer (a consumer, a pro-
sumer, a generator, or even a supplier) to decide with which peer to
trade (buy from or sell to) energy according to its own objective, e.g.
minimum costs, maximum proﬁts, minimum pollution, most reliable
energy supply, etc.
P2P energy trading cannot be applied without a software platform,
which enables the information exchange among peers, and also assists
the system operators (e.g. DSOs) to monitor and control the distribution
network. In addition, diﬀerent trading rules deﬁned by the platform
also have signiﬁcant inﬂuences on the decisions made by peers when
trading with other peers.
Various software platforms can be designed to facilitate P2P energy
trading. The “Elecbay” proposed in this paper is used for the P2P energy
trading in a grid-connected Microgrid. The key players of P2P energy
trading include buyers, sellers, suppliers (suppliers can act as buyers or
sellers), DSOs and the “Elecbay”. The interactions of the key players
during P2P energy trading are illustrated by Fig. 2.
“Elecbay” in Fig. 2 is a software platform on which peers (either
energy sellers or buyers) trade energy with others. Energy sellers list the
items, i.e. their surplus energy over half an hour, for sale. Energy buyers
browse all the listed items and then place orders. Each order contains
Bidding
Exchanging
Settlement
Premises
Microgrid
Cell
Region
Power Grid Layer
D
im
en
si
o
n
 1
ICT Layer
Control Layer
Business Layer
Fig. 1. A four-layer system architecture of Peer-to-Peer energy trading.
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the information including the time period for the energy exchange, the
amount of energy to be exchanged, the price of the energy to be ex-
changed and the details about the seller and buyer, e.g. the identities,
the ratings of energy supply reliability, etc. Alternatively, energy sellers
can also browse the items listed by energy buyers, i.e. the required
energy over half an hour, and then place orders.
After the orders are placed by peers, they are either accepted or
rejected by Elecbay, DSOs, and energy suppliers as shown in Fig. 2. The
acceptance or rejection of each order is determined based on the net-
work constraints, e.g. voltage excursion, thermal overloading, etc.
After the order acceptance or rejection, each peer generates/con-
sumes the amount of energy as promised in the accepted orders. Energy
is delivered through the distribution network. The energy balancing
services are provided by Elecbay. The actual energy generation and
consumption of each peer is recorded by smart meters.
However, as it is electrical energy traded on Elecbay, there can
possibly be a disparity between the promised amount of energy in the
placed orders and the actual energy consumption or generation re-
corded by smart meters. For peers who fail to generate/consume the
promised amount of energy, they are required to trade with suppliers
with less beneﬁcial (selling or buying) prices and even charged with
penalty. In this paper the selling and buying prices with suppliers and
penalty are calculated based on the existing methods that are currently
used in the GB (Great Britain) electricity wholesale market [23]. Pay-
ments are all made to Elecbay. After deducting service charges, Elecbay
allocates the money to suppliers, DSOs, energy sellers, and energy
buyers if they contribute to the energy balancing.
The processing of each order placed in Elecbay is further demon-
strated in a time sequence in Fig. 3.
The publishing and bidding time period is the ﬁrst time period of
order process in Elecbay, during which peers are able to list items (the
surplus energy over half an hour for sale, or the required energy over
half an hour for purchase) and place orders. This time period starts
several days, weeks or months before the half-hourly energy exchange
time period, and ends by the gate closure, which is one hour before the
energy exchange time period in this paper. Orders can be placed, can-
celled or modiﬁed by peers only before the gate closure. Peers list items
and place orders based on the forecast of their own energy generation
and consumption. They make decisions to trade with other peers by
comparing the amount and prices of energy to be exchanged.
During the one hour time period between the gate closure and the
energy exchange time period, the order acceptance/rejection is carried
out by the DSOs. They evaluate if there is going to be a network con-
straint violation, e.g. voltage excursion, thermal overloading, etc, when
all the placed orders are accepted. Once a network constraint violation
is identiﬁed, DSOs are the only entities which have the permission to
modify or cancel orders after the gate closure. The rules for order
modiﬁcation or cancellation are various. For example, with the last on
ﬁrst oﬀ principle, the orders placed at a later time (i.e. closer to the gate
closure) have a higher possibility to be cancelled.
During the half-hourly energy exchange time period, Elecbay pro-
vides the energy balancing services. The cost of all the actions taken for
the energy balancing is recorded for the settlement time period.
Besides, the actual energy generation and consumption of each peer is
also recorded by the smart meter in each premise.
In the settlement time period, Elecbay liaises with DSOs and sup-
pliers and provides the energy bill of each peer. This settlement and
billing process takes time, and therefore the bills cannot be available to
peers immediately. 1–31 days is considered in this paper as the length
of this time period. As mentioned previously, for peers who fail to
generate/consume the promised amount of energy, they are required to
trade with suppliers with less beneﬁcial (selling or buying) prices and
even be charged with penalty. Elecbay collects the payment received
from energy buyers, keeps the service charges, and then sends the rest
to the relevant energy sellers and suppliers.
“Elecbay” is one of the ﬁrst platforms proposed for P2P energy
trading in LV distribution networks, where energy consumers and
prosumers are given the options to be able to not only trade energy with
energy suppliers, but also trade among each other. One peer is able to
be either a seller or a buyer at diﬀerent time periods of a day, which is
very diﬀerent compared to the current GB electricity wholesale market,
where generators are constantly sellers and suppliers are constantly
buyers.
The publishing and bidding time period is the most unique time
Suppliers
DSOs
ElecbayBuyers Sellers
Payment
PaymentPre-payment
List ItemsBrowse and
Order
Power Imbalance ServicesPower Imbalance Services
Order AcceptanceOrder Acceptance
and Delivery and Delivery
Fig. 2. Interactions of key players during P2P energy trading.
Publishing and Bidding Energy Exchange Settlement
t
At least 30 min 1 Hour Half an Hour 1-31 Days
Gate Closure Bill Date
Before 11:00 11:30 12:30 13:00
Fig. 3. An example of processing of an order in
Elecbay.
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period that makes P2P energy trading arrangements diﬀerent from
other existing energy trading arrangements in the distribution net-
works. Therefore it is the basis of the study on other time periods in P2P
energy trading. The simulation method and case study demonstrated in
Sections 4 and 5, which validate the publishing and bidding time period
in a grid-connected LV Microgrid with diﬀerent types of energy pro-
sumers, are both based on the design of Elecbay proposed in this sec-
tion.
4. Simulation of P2P bidding
The simulation of the bidding through the P2P energy trading
platform “Elecbay” is of great importance, which could be used to:
1. demonstrate how energy consumers and prosumers within a grid-
connected LV Microgrid carry out P2P energy trading with each
other;
2. obtain new load proﬁles of energy consumers and prosumers to
quantify how their energy consumption is aﬀected by the P2P en-
ergy trading; and
3. enable analysis and control of grid-connected Microgrids and power
grids under the P2P energy trading.
The simulation mimics the bidding of energy consumers and pro-
sumers before the gate closure. Input data of the simulation, including
the generation proﬁles of energy prosumers and the consumption pro-
ﬁles of energy consumers and prosumers, is based on forecast in-
formation. Besides, the following assumptions were made:
1. The P2P energy trading through “Elecbay” is competitive, which
means energy consumers and prosumers are not aggregated with
each other for achieving higher beneﬁts via co-operation.
2. Energy consumers and prosumers are considered as “good citizens”,
who contribute to maintaining local energy balance.
3. Energy suppliers (i.e. the electricity retailers) are passive peers in
this paper. They buy energy from energy prosumers with low unit
prices, and sell energy to energy consumers and prosumers with
high unit prices. Energy consumers and prosumers consider energy
suppliers as the last peer to trade with during the P2P bidding. This
assumption is consistent with the reality in many countries such as
the UK.
4. Service charges of Elecbay are neglected in this paper
4.1. Roles of ﬂexible demand and storage in Peer-to-Peer energy trading
In Elecbay, energy consumers and prosumers sell and buy energy by
scheduling the energy devices in their own premises. There are mainly
three types of energy devices owned by typical small-scale residential
and commercial energy consumers and prosumers, as shown in Fig. 4.
Generation includes Photovoltaic (PV) panels, wind turbines, Combined
Heat and Power (CHPs) units, micro-turbines, etc. Demand includes
non-ﬂexible demand and ﬂexible demand. Electrical storage, which is
able to either provide or consume energy, includes batteries, electrical
vehicles (EVs), etc.
The strategic bidding behaviours of small-scale energy consumers
and prosumers in P2P energy trading mainly rely on the scheduling of
ﬂexible demand and storage systems, if the generation is considered to
be from the uncontrollable renewable energy. DGs from intermittent
renewable energy are able to be managed through disconnecting/re-
connecting operations or derating maximum power outputs for energy
trading purposes. However, those techniques are not investigated in
this paper because it will be more beneﬁcial for each individual peer to
always keep its DG connected and generating maximum power, con-
sidering the zero marginal cost of renewable energy. Although energy
storage systems are able to provide signiﬁcant amount of ﬂexibility for
P2P energy trading, they are still generally very expensive. Therefore,
this paper focuses on investigating the feasibility of P2P energy trading
with ﬂexible demand scheduling only. Speciﬁcally, electric water hea-
ters with tanks are considered as representatives. The use of energy
storage was not considered in this paper.
Note that in this paper, the ﬂexible demand is scheduled without
sacriﬁcing any satisfaction of end users. The ﬂexible demands con-
sidered in the case study of this paper are electric water heaters with
tanks, which have thermal storage capability. This capability results in
the fact that there are many diﬀerent heating schedules that are all able
to totally satisfy users’ demand (in this case, to prepare enough hot
water with required temperature for users throughout the day), and
thus brings ﬂexibility for scheduling. For example, to prepare required
amount of hot water with required temperature to be used at 5:00 p.m.,
the water can be pre-heated either during 3:00–4:00 p.m. or during
4:00–5:00 p.m. without any diﬀerence in terms of satisfying users’ hot
water need. In other words, by limiting the minimum and maximum
water temperature in tank as presented in Section 4.2.1, the scheduling
of water heaters will not cause any dissatisfaction for end users. This
way of dealing with ﬂexible demands is commonly used in many ex-
isting studies such as [24,25]. Beyond this way, to compromise sa-
tisfaction of end users will bring more ﬂexibility for scheduling but
involve more social cost at the same time, which is not considered in
this paper.
4.2. Simulation of a single time period using game theory
This section illustrates the method used for simulating the P2P
bidding within a single energy exchange time period through the P2P
energy trading platform Elecbay. Game theory was used for the simu-
lation.
There are two basic types of games in game theory: cooperative
games and non-cooperative games. A cooperative game is a game where
groups of players enforce cooperative behaviour, and hence the game is
a competition between coalitions of players, rather than between in-
dividual players. A non-cooperative game is a game in which players
make decisions independently, for example, auctions and strategic
voting [26]. A Nash equilibrium is a solution of a non-cooperative game
involving two or more players, in which each player is assumed to know
the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player has any-
thing to gain by changing only their own strategy [27].
During the P2P bidding for a single energy exchange time period,
the interaction among peers is modelled as a non-cooperative game,
due to the assumptions made at the beginning of this section. The so-
lution of the game, in which no peer is able to increase the beneﬁt by
modifying only its own placed orders, is the Nash equilibrium, which is
considered as the result of P2P bidding through Elecbay.
4.2.1. The formulation of P2P bidding as a non-cooperative game
Players of the game are energy consumers and prosumers with
ﬂexible demand. Denote N={1, 2, …, i …, n}, where n is the number
of players in the game, and N is the set of players in the game.
Strategies of a player are the decided status of ﬂexible demand,
which directly aﬀect the amount of electricity to be injected to (positive
value) or absorbed from (negative value) the Microgrid and are denoted
by = …s j m, 1,2, ,
j
i i
ii , where mi stands for the number of strategies that
Storage
Batteries,
EVs, etc
Demand Generation
Non-flexible 
Demand, Flexible 
Demand
PV, Wind Turbine,
CHP, Micro-
turbine, etc
Fig. 4. Categories of energy devices in residential/commercial premises.
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player i can choose. Si is denoted as the set of strategies of player i. In
this paper, mi=2, which means that the ﬂexible demand of each
consumer or prosumer is scheduled either ON or OFF during the 30-min
energy exchange time period.
A strategy combination is the combination of strategies chosen by
the players in the game, which is denoted as
∈ … … …( ) ( )s s s s s s s{ , , , , , , , , }n m m mn11 12 1 1 2 n1 2 . Each strategy combination consists
of n elements. Denote S to be the set of all the possible strategy com-
binations in the game.
The total number of strategy combinations in the game is
∏=
=
M m
i
n
i
1 (1)
The payoﬀ function is a mathematical function describing the award
obtained by a single player at the outcome of a game, which motivates
the player to adopt certain strategy and thus is the key to simulate the
behaviour of the player [28]. The payoﬀ function used in this paper is
deﬁned as follows:
= + ×+
− −
−
u
L E C
E ε
( )
| |
k
i out i k k
i
mgout k (2)
in which
= ⎧⎨⎩
<
⩾
− − − −
− −
L
E if E
if E
|min( )| min( ) 0
0 min( ) 0
out i k out i k
out i k
where k ∈ [1, M]. k denotes one of the strategy combinations in S; uki
denotes the payoﬀ value of player i in strategy combination k; Eout-i-k
denotes the amount of electrical energy injected to (positive value) or
absorbed from (negative value) the Microgrid by player i in strategy
combination k; − −Emin( )out i k is the minimum value of Eout-i-k for all
players in all strategy combinations; L is a constant that levels up the uk
i
to always be a non-negative value; Therefore, if ⩾− −Emin( ) 0out i k ,
meaning that all the values of Eout-i-k for any player in any strategy
combination is above or equal to zero, hence L=0 is suﬃcient to
guarantee that uk
i is a non-negative value; in contrast, if
<− −Emin( ) 0out i k , L needs to be at least equal to the absolute value of
− −Emin( )out i k in order to guarantee that uki is a non-negative value;
|Emgout-k| denotes the absolute value of energy exchange between the
Microgrid and the utility grid in strategy combination k; ε is a very
small positive constant which guarantees the denominator not to be
zero; Ck
i stands for the comfort index of user i in strategy combination k,
which will be explained in details later in this section.
The higher the payoﬀ value uk
i is, the better the outcome of strategy
combination k is recognized by the player i. As introduced in Eq. (2),
the payoﬀ value of player i in strategy combination k is determined by
three factors, as explained below.
The ﬁrst factor is Eout-i-k. The higher Eout-i-k is, the larger amount of
energy is injected to the Microgrid, or the smaller amount of energy is
consumed by the player i, and the higher possibility there is that player
i is able to sell more energy to, or buy less energy from other players or
energy suppliers via the P2P energy trading platform. Therefore, Eout-i-k
is placed in the numerator so that the higher Eout-i-k is, the higher uk
i is.
The second factor is |Emgout-k|. This factor is introduced to the payoﬀ
function in order to reﬂect and minimise the energy exchange between
the Microgrid and the external utility grid for local energy balancing.
Therefore, |Emgout-k| is placed in the denominator so that the lower
|Emgout-k| is, the higher uk
i is.
The third factor is the comfort index Ck
i . It is deﬁned to guarantee
that the scheduling of ﬂexible demand does not worsen the customer
comfort, speciﬁcally thermal comfort given that water heaters with
tanks are considered in this paper. The thermal index Ck
i is placed in the
numerator as a multiplier and takes a binary value (either 0 or 1) fol-
lowing this principle: if the strategy chosen by a player does not lead to
thermal comfort violation or does alleviate the existing thermal comfort
violation, Ck
i takes the value of 1 to approve the current strategy;
otherwise, Ck
i denies the strategy by taking the value of 0, which results
in the minimum value of the payoﬀ function uk
i (equal to 0).
Quantitatively, the thermal comfort is measured by the temperature of
water in the tank after scheduling, denoted by Tk
i [29]. The detailed
logic on how Ck
i takes values is described as the following formula:
=
⎧
⎨
⎪⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
> <
< >
⩽ ⩽
C
if T T and the heater is ON or if T T
and the heater is OFF
if T T and the heater is ON or if T T
and the heater is OFF
or if T T T
0, ,
1, ,
,
k
i
k
i
max
i
k
i
min
i
k
i
min
i
k
i
max
i
min
i
k
i
max
i
(3)
where Tmin
i and Tmax
i stand for the lower and the upper limits of the
water temperature in the tank owned by player i.
The relationship between Ck
i and Tk
i is further explained in Table 1.
If ⩽ ⩽T T Tmini ki maxi , which means the water temperature in the tank
after scheduling is within the temperature limits, the comfort index Ck
i
equals to 1 whenever the ﬂexible demand is ON or OFF. In this case,
both strategies are approved because the thermal comfort will always
be guaranteed.
If <T Tki mini , which means the water temperature in the tank after
scheduling is lower than the lower temperature limit, the value of
comfort index Ck
i depends on the strategy taken. The Strategy 1 (ON) is
helpful to increase the water temperature (although still lower than the
lower limit), so it is approved, i.e. Ck
i equals to 1. On the other hand, the
Strategy 2 (OFF) will further decrease the water temperature, which
worsens the thermal comfort, so it is denied by setting Ck
i as 0. The
situations where >T Tki maxi are similar to those where <T Tki mini , so the
corresponding explanation will not be presented for conciseness.
With the payoﬀ function (2), the associated payoﬀ value of player i
given a strategy combination s can be calculated, donated as u s( )i .
4.2.2. The calculation of the Nash equilibrium in a non-cooperative game
This subsection describes the method used to calculate the Nash
equilibrium of the non-cooperative game established in the previous
sub-section.
In game theory, a player's strategy is deﬁned as any of the options
the player is able to choose in a strategy set where the outcome depends
not only on its own action, but also on actions of other players. A pure
strategy provides a complete deﬁnition of how a player plays the game.
A mixed strategy is an assignment of a probability to each pure strategy.
It allows for each player to randomly select a pure strategy. Mixed
strategies are considered in the calculation in this sub-section. It is as-
sumed that for any player i, the probability of adopting one pure
strategy ∈s S
j
i i
i is σ j
i
i. The mixed strategy of player i is therefore deﬁned
as = …σ j m{ | 1,2, , }ji i ii , donated as σ i, and the following equation holds:
∑ =
=
σ 1
j
m
j
i
1i
i
i
(4)
A mix strategy combination of all the players is donated as
= −σ σ σ( , )i i , where −σ i represents the set of the mix strategies of all the
players except player i. The payoﬀ value of player i given a mix strategy
combination σ is calculated by
∑ ∏=
∈ ∈
u σ u s σ( ) [ ( )· ]i
s S
i
i N
j
i
i
(5)
Table 1
Relationship between the comfort index of a player and the water temperature in the tank
after scheduling.
<T Tki mini ⩽ ⩽T T Tmini ki maxi >T Tki maxi
Strategy 1 (Flexible Demand ON) Ck
i = 1 Ck
i = 1 Ck
i = 0
Strategy 2 (Flexible Demand OFF) Ck
i = 0 Ck
i = 1 Ck
i = 1
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where = …s s s s( , , , )
j j j
n1 2
n1 2 .
Given all the above, the deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium is able to be
derived. A mixed strategy combination ∗σ is a Nash equilibrium if
⩾ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈∗ ∗−u σ u σ σ i N σ( ) ( , ) , , Σi i i i i i (6)
where Σi denotes the set of all the mixed strategies of player i.
According to [28], the calculation of this Nash equilibrium is
equivalent to solving the following optimization problem:
∑
∑
−
− ⩽ ∀ = … ∀ ∈
= ∀ ∈
⩾ ∀ = … ∀ ∈
∈
−
=
β u σ
s t u σ s β j m i N
σ i N
σ j m i N
min [ ( )]
. . ( , ) 0 1, , ,
1
0 1, , ,
i N
i i
i i
j
i i i
i
j
m
j
i
j
i i
i
1
i
i
i
i
i (7)
where βi is an ancillary variable, which represents the highest possible
payoﬀ value of the player i. It is a decision variable that is calculated by
solving the optimization problem expressed by Eq. (7), rather than a
parameter that is given as input to the optimization. Considering that
u σ( )i stands for the payoﬀ value of player i in the strategy combination
σ , the objective function of the optimization problem (7) is to minimize
the sum of diﬀerences between the highest possible payoﬀ value βi and
the payoﬀ value u σ( )i in the strategy combination σ , so that after op-
timization, the calculated strategy combination σ is the one that makes
each player have a payoﬀ value that is close to the highest possible
value as much as possible. It is proved that this strategy combination σ
is just a Nash Equilibrium of the game studied. Detailed proof has been
provided in [28].
By solving the optimization problem presented as Eq. (7), the Nash
equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is found.
Nash Equilibrium 
alĐulaƟŽŶ
(EquaƟŽŶ (7))
Water Temperature
Update
(EquaƟŽŶs (8) aŶd (9))
ct-1
strategy 
adopted
Tt
/ŶŝƟaů
temperature
Nash Equilibrium 
alĐulaƟŽŶ
(EquaƟŽŶ (7))
Water Temperature
Update
(EquaƟŽŶs (8) aŶd (9))
ct
strategy 
adopted
Energy Exchange Time Period t-1 Energy Exchange Time Period t
Tt+1Tt-1
Fig. 5. The procedure of the multi-time period simulation.
Fig. 6. The Benchmark LV Microgrid adapted from [29].
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4.3. Simulation of multiple time periods considering time-coupled
constraints of water temperature
This section illustrates the consideration for simulating the P2P
bidding for multiple energy exchange time periods through the P2P
energy trading platform Elecbay. In any energy exchange time period t,
the initial water temperature needs to be given for each player to cal-
culate the payoﬀ value, based on which the control strategy is made and
the Nash equilibrium is found. For a water heater of any player, the
initial water temperature of time period t is determined by the initial
temperature and the strategy of the previous time period t− 1. The
quantitative relationship is speciﬁed as follows:
= − − + ⎛⎝ − ⎞⎠− − −
⎡⎣− ⎤⎦ − ⎡⎣− ⎤⎦T θ θ T e c QR e( ) · 1t t t t
t
RC t
t
RC1 1 1
∆
1
∆
(8)
where Tt and Tt−1 are the initial water temperature in tank of time
periods t and t− 1; θt−1 is the ambient temperature in time period
t− 1; ct−1 is the actual ON/OFF status of the water heater during time
period t− 1; Δt is the length of an energy exchange time period; Q, R
and C are heater capacity, thermal resistance and thermal capacitance
of the water heater respectively. When hot water is consumed, the
water temperature changes by
= − +− − −T T V d θ d
V
[ ·( ) · ]
t
cur t t t t, 1 1 1
(9)
where Tcur,t is the initial water temperature of time period t before
considering the consumption during time period t− 1; V is the mass of
water in full storage; dt−1 is the demand of hot water drawn during
time period t− 1.
With Eqs. (8) and (9), the multiple energy exchange time periods are
linked and the water temperature change is simulated throughout the
time line. The procedure of the multi-time period simulation is sum-
marized in Fig. 5.
Note that if the strategies at the calculated Nash equilibrium are
pure strategies, the pure strategies can directly be taken as the adopted
control strategies, c, between the Nash equilibrium calculation and
water temperature update blocks in Fig. 5. However, if the strategies at
the calculated Nash equilibrium are mixed strategies, the adopted
(a) PV Generation Profile [30] 
(b) Load Profiles of Non-flexible Demand [30] 
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Fig. 7. Input data of Peers 1 and 2, and the total non-ﬂexible demands of the Microgrid in Case Study 5.1.
Table 2
Key parameters of Peers 1 and 2 in Case Study 5.1.
Parameters Peer 1 Peer 2
Maximum PV generation 5 kW 5 kW
Maximum ﬂexible demand 3 kW 3 kW
[Tmin, Tmax] of ﬂexible demand [55, 65] (°C) [55, 65] (°C)
Q of ﬂexible demand 3 kW 3 kW
R of ﬂexible demand 1.52 °C/kW 1.52 °C/kW
C of ﬂexible demand 863.4 kWh/°C 863.4 kWh/°C
V of ﬂexible demand 50 gallon 50 gallon
Maximum non-ﬂexible demand 4 kW 4 kW
Non-ﬂexible load proﬁle Type 1 Type 2
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control strategies need to be decided by sampling from the probability
distribution in the mixed strategies, e.g. using Monte Carlo sampling,
and in this case the multi-time period simulation needs to be conducted
many times to get results with statistical signiﬁcance.
5. Case study
5.1. Case study in a Benchmark LV Microgrid
A Benchmark LV Microgrid, as shown in Fig. 6, was used for the case
study to test the bidding through the proposed P2P energy trading
(a) ON/OFF Status of Flexible Demand of Peers 1 and 2 
(b) Total Power Consumption of Peers 1 and 2 without and with P2P 
(c) Net Load of the Microgrid 
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Fig. 8. Simulation results of Peers 1 and 2, and the Microgrid in Case Study 5.1.
Table 3
Comparison of energy exchange between the Microgrid and the utility grid over one day
and peak load of the Microgrid in Case Study 5.1.
Energy
Exchange
(kWh)
Reduction of
Energy Exchange
Peak
Load
(kW)
Reduction of
Peak Load
Without P2P 339.34 N/A 40.51 N/A
With P2P 308.15 9.19% 38.73 4.41%
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Fig. 9. PV and wind generation proﬁles in Case Study 5.2.
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platform “Elecbay” [2,29].
There are 10 peers in the benchmark LV Microgrid in total. It was
assumed that (1) all of the peers have both non-ﬂexible and ﬂexible
demands in their premises; (2) all of the ﬂexible demands are electric
water heaters with tanks; (3) all of the peers except Peer 4 have DGs
connected to their premises; and (4) all of the DGs are considered to be
PV panels in this case study.
Table 4
Key parameters of Peers 1, 2 and 3 in Case Study 5.2.
Parameters Peer 1 Peer 2 Peer 3
Maximum PV generation 5 kW 5 kW N/A
Maximum wind generation N/A N/A 5 kW
Maximum ﬂexible demand 3 kW 3 kW 3 kW
[Tmin, Tmax] of ﬂexible demand [55, 65] (°C) [55, 65] (°C) [55, 65] (°C)
Q of ﬂexible demand 3 kW 3 kW 3 kW
R of ﬂexible demand 1.52 °C/kW 1.52 °C/kW 1.52 °C/kW
C of ﬂexible demand 863.4 kWh/°C 863.4 kWh/°C 863.4 kWh/°C
V of ﬂexible demand 50 gallon 50 gallon 50 gallon
Maximum non-ﬂexible demand 4 kW 4 kW 4 kW
Non-ﬂexible load proﬁle Type 1 Type 2 Type 1
(a) ON/OFF Status of Flexible Demand of Peers 1, 2 and 3 
(b) Total Power Consumption of Peers 1, 2 and 3 without and with P2P 
(c) Net Load of the Microgrid 
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Fig. 10. Simulation results of Peers 1, 2 and 3, and the Microgrid in Case Study 5.2.
Table 5
Comparison of energy exchange between the Microgrid and the utility grid over one day
and peak load of the Microgrid in Case Study 5.2.
Energy
Exchange
(kWh)
Reduction of
Energy Exchange
Peak
Load
(kW)
Reduction of
Peak Load
Without P2P 204.31 N/A 31.87 N/A
With P2P 117.49 42.49% 26.26 17.60%
Table 6
Comparison of results in Case Study 5.1 and Case Study 5.2.
Reduction of Energy
Exchange with P2P
Reduction of Peak Load
with P2P
Case Study 5.1 (Low
Diversity)
9.19% 4.41%
Case Study 5.2 (High
Diversity)
42.49% 17.60%
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The input data, including the PV generation proﬁles, and the load
proﬁles of the non-ﬂexible demand (both Types 1, 1-person residential
premise and Type 2, 2-person residential premise), were produced by
the CREST (Centre for Renewable Energy Systems Technology) demand
model [30]. The inputs of Peers 1 and 2 are taken as examples that are
shown in Fig. 7(a) and (b) and Table 2. The overall power consumption
of non-ﬂexible demands in the Microgrid is shown in Fig. 7(c).
L=26.00 (kW) and ε =0.01 (kW) for the payoﬀ function Eq. (2).
As shown in Fig. 6, Peers 1 and 2 are both located in the same
residential apartment building. Moreover, as listed in Table 2, their
maximum PV generation, ﬂexible demand and non-ﬂexible demand are
also the same. Therefore, they were chosen as examples throughout the
case study to demonstrate and compare the impact of P2P energy
trading on the residential energy prosumers of the same scale but with
diﬀerent power consumption patterns.
Simulation results are presented in Fig. 8 and Table 3.
Fig. 8(a) shows that with P2P energy trading, the ﬂexible demand
owned by peers of diﬀerent non-ﬂexible load proﬁles are scheduled to
be ON during diﬀerent time periods of the day. The ﬂexible demand is
less likely to be turned ON or OFF simultaneously, even given that they
are assumed to have very similar types of water heater, water usage
pattern and initial water temperature in tank. Fig. 8(b) further illus-
trates the power consumption of those peers with or without P2P en-
ergy trading over a day. The peaks of their power generation and
consumption appear at diﬀerent time periods of the day.
Fig. 8(c) and Table 3 show that with P2P energy trading, the overall
energy exchange between the Microgrid and the utility grid is reduced.
However, the local generation and demands are not well balanced due
to the relatively low diversity of generation and load proﬁles of peers.
The reduction of the peak load of the whole Microgrid after adopting
P2P energy trading is only 4.41%.
5.2. Case study in a LV Microgrid with higher peer variety
Based on Case Study 5.1, another case was designed with higher
peer diversity. The DGs owned by peers 3, 8 and 10 were changed to
wind turbines with the same generation capacity. The generation pro-
ﬁles of the wind turbines were shown in Fig. 9. Other relevant inputs
were illustrated in Fig. 7(b), (c) and Table 4. L=26.00 (kW) and ε =
0.01 (kW) for the payoﬀ function Eq. (2).
Simulation results are presented in Fig. 10 and Table 5.
Fig. 10(a) shows that with P2P energy trading, the ﬂexible demand
owned by peers of diﬀerent non-ﬂexible load proﬁles and diﬀerent type
of DGs are scheduled to be ON during diﬀerent time periods of the day.
The ﬂexible demand is less likely to be turned ON or OFF simulta-
neously. Especially for Peer 3 whose DG is a wind turbine, its ﬂexible
demand is scheduled in a very diﬀerent pattern compared with Peers 1
and 2. Fig. 10(b) illustrates the power consumption of those peers with
or without P2P energy trading over a day. The peaks of their power
generation and consumption appear at diﬀerent time periods of the day.
Fig. 10(c) and Table 5 show that with P2P energy trading, the
overall energy exchange between the Microgrid and the utility grid is
signiﬁcantly reduced. The local generation and demands are also more
balanced compared with the simulation results in Case Study 5.1. The
reduction of the peak load of the whole Microgrid has increased to
17.60%, compared with 4.41% in Case Study 5.1. This is due to the
increased variety of peers in the Microgrid.
Compared the results of Case Studies 5.1 and 5.2, as shown in
Table 6, it is concluded that with higher peer variety, the reduction of
energy exchange between the Microgrid and the utility grid with P2P
energy trading signiﬁcantly increased (from 9.19% to 42.49% com-
paring the two cases). Besides, the reduction of peak load with P2P
energy trading also rose (from 4.41% to 17.60% comparing the two
cases). That is to say, P2P energy trading is able to better reduce the
energy exchange between the Microgrid and the utility grid, and better
balance local generation and demand.
Note that only one type of ﬂexible demand (electric water heaters
with tanks) is considered so far in the case study. With the introduction
of other advanced technologies such as energy storage, ﬂexible DG
operations, etc, the beneﬁts of P2P energy trading have the potential to
become even more signiﬁcant.
6. Conclusion
P2P energy trading is one of the promising paradigms of future
smart grid, which enables the direct energy trading among energy
consumers and prosumers in local power networks. A four-layer system
architecture of P2P energy trading was proposed to identify and cate-
gorize the key elements and technologies involved in P2P energy
trading. A P2P energy trading platform “Elecbay” was designed for a
grid-connected LV Microgrid. The simulation of P2P bidding among
energy consumers and prosumers through the energy trading platform
“Elecbay” was developed using game theory.
Case studies show that P2P energy trading is able to reduce the
energy exchange between the Microgrid and the utility grid and balance
local generation and demand, and therefore, has the potential to fa-
cilitate a large penetration of renewable energy resources in the power
grid. The increased variety of energy consumers and prosumers in the
Microgrid is able to further improve the beneﬁts of P2P energy trading.
This paper demonstrates the possibilities and potential beneﬁts of
integrating P2P energy trading in local power networks from the
technical perspectives. However, a series of reforms on the current
energy policy, laws and energy trading systems are still required before
it becomes a reality. Besides, the introduction of P2P energy trading
arrangements also has the potential to change the consumers’ and
prosumers’ behaviours of energy consumption. For example, they will
tend to consume more hot water when there is more electricity gen-
erated by their renewable energy sources. Those changes will further
lead to conﬂicts between the economic performance and the social
dissatisfaction. This is one of the directions for future research in this
area.
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